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Abstract
A traditional explanation for why sovereign countries repay debt is that they want
to keep a good reputation so they can easily borrow more. This explanation does
not hold if a country has access to an adequate means of savings regardless of the
country’s past actions. With such access, a country gets only transient beneﬁts
from maintaining a good relationship with bankers, and such beneﬁts cannot
support borrowing. However, if a country is involved in a myriad of trust relation-
ships, the country’s reputation can spill over to a nondebt relationship which has
enduring beneﬁts. Such a spillover can allow a country’s reputation to support a
large amount of borrowing.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Unlike lenders in domestic credit markets, lenders in the
internationalcredit markethavelittle recourseifborrowers
do not repay debt. There are few direct legal sanctions that
can be used against such borrowers, especially when they
are sovereign countries. In the 19th century, military inva-
sions were used to enforce international debt repayment,
butthatsortofthingisno longerdone.(SeeEnglish1996.)
Given this situation, researchers have wondered, why do
sovereign countries ever repay debt?
An early answer to this question was offered by Eaton
and Gersovitz (1981). They argue that sovereign countries
may repay their debt because they fear that defaulting on
it will tarnish their reputations and thus hinder their ability
to borrow in the future. Much work has followed that ex-
planation; see, for example, Kletzer 1984; Manuelli 1986;
Grossman and Van Huyck 1988; Atkeson 1991; and Cole,
Dow, and English 1995.
Recently, however, Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) have
challenged this explanation. In a provocative article, they
claim to show that “under fairly general conditions, lend-
ingtosmallcountriesmustbesupportedbythedirectsanc-
tions available to creditors, and cannot be supported by a
country’s ‘reputation for repayment’” (1989b, p. 43, ab-
stract). A key reason for the difference between this result
and the results in the rest of the literature is that Bulow and
Rogoff assume that, regardless of a country’s past behav-
ior, it can earn the market rate of return by saving abroad
with risk-neutralbankers who can committo honoring any
contracts they sign. The rest of the literature assumes, ei-
ther explicitly or implicitly, that if a country defaults, it
cannot save.†
Inthisarticle,wereexaminetheargumentofBulowand
Rogoff (1989b). For clarity’s sake, we state their argument
in two parts. First, they claim that a good reputation for re-
paying loans cannot by itself support lending to a sover-
eigncountry. Second, they claimthat such lending must be
supported by direct sanctions. We ﬁnd that the ﬁrst claim
holdsandprovideasimpleproofforourmodel.(Theypro-
vide a proof in a more general setup.) We ﬁnd that the sec-
ond claim does not hold. To disprove it, we construct a
modelinwhichtherearenodirectsanctionsonasovereign
country, butin which reputation cansupport large amounts
of lending to that country.
We argue that since countries are involved in many dif-
ferenttypesofrelationships,reputationmaybeabletosup-
portdebtevenwithBulowandRogoff’sassumption(about
the ability to save abroad) if the analysis is expanded from
partialreputationmodels,inwhichdebtisviewedinisola-
tion, to a general reputation model which includes all the
country’s relationships. We develop such a general reputa-
tion model in which, for simplicity, there is just one other
relationship besides the debt relationship.
We ﬁnd that the ability of reputation to support debt in
our general reputation model depends critically on the na-
ture of that other relationship. For debt to be supported, the
payoffs in the other relationship must provide the country
with net beneﬁts from maintaining a good reputation—or
reputation spillovers—which, along an equilibrium path,
in some sense, both are large enough and last forever. In
general, for these net beneﬁts to be calculated, the whole
equilibriummustbecalculated,andsimpleconditionscan-
not be put on the primitives of the environment to ensure
that reputation spills over enough to support large levels
of debt. In the special, but common, setup in which the
other relationship is a simple repeated one, these net bene-
ﬁts are constant, and simple conditions on the primitives
ofthemodelcanbeobtainedwhichensurethatlargelevels
of debt can be supported by spillovers. For brevity’s sake,
we will refer to relationships with such large and long-last-
ing beneﬁts of maintaining a good relationship as relation-
ships with enduring beneﬁts. We will refer to relationships
in which, along any equilibrium path, the net beneﬁts from
maintaining a good relationship eventually become small
as relationships with transient beneﬁts.
We begin by reviewing Bulow and Rogoff’s (1989b)
ﬁrst claim, that in a model of a single debt relationship,
there can be no positive debt in equilibrium. We then ex-
amine their second claim by adding other relationships to
the model. We brieﬂy consider relationships which have
transient beneﬁts. We ﬁnd that even though reputation can
spill over from the debt relationship to some other tran-
sient beneﬁt relationships, with this type of added relation-
ship there is a unique equilibrium with no debt.
Next, we consider adding other relationships which
have enduring beneﬁts. The simplest examples of such
relationshipsarerepeatedrelationshipsinwhichtheperpe-
riod beneﬁts from maintaining the relationships are con-
stant.Forsuch relationships,thepresentvalue ofmaintain-
ing a good relationship is necessarily large for high dis-
count factors. Of course, there are more elaborate dynamic
relationships with physical state variables which also have
enduring beneﬁts. We illustrate how differently spillover
works when the other relationship is enduring by consider-
ing a model with debt and a simple repeated labor relation-
ship. In the model, reputation spillovers support debt in the
sense that certain spillover strategies, which connect be-
haviorinonerelationshiptobehaviorintheother,areequi-
libria. These equilibria have positive debt. Thus, these are
examples of models in which there are no direct sanctions,
yet debt can be supported in equilibrium—precisely what
Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) claim is not possible.
Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) do seem to recognize, how-
ever, that there could be exceptions to their claim. At the
end of their article, they discuss a trigger strategy model in
which a country is playing a tariff game in which either
raising tariffs or defaulting on foreign debt triggers a cost-
ly trade war. Bulow and Rogoff conjecture that such trig-
ger strategies can potentially support debt, thus invalidat-
ing their second claim. One interpretation of our article is
that we work out conditions for this conjecture to be true.
We ﬁnd that for it to be true, reputation in the debt rela-





ing to small countries must be supported by direct sanc-
tions. A secondary contribution of our article is to exposit
a model of a country’s general reputation which is poten-
tially interesting in its own right. Indeed, if one agrees with
Bulow and Rogoff’s (1989b) assessment of the data that
one way or another the citizens and government of a coun-
try in default can always ﬁnd ways to earn the market rate
of return on their investments, then the Bulow and Rogoff
(1989b) article essentially kills the standard partial reputa-
tion models (and lays the groundwork for the direct sanc-tions approach adopted by Bulow and Rogoff 1989a and
Fernandez and Rosenthal 1990). In that light, one view of
our article is that it revives the reputation approach. More-
over, if one agrees with English’s (1996) assessment that
the historical evidence for direct sanctions is weak, then
currently at least, our general reputation model is the only
model in which reputation can support debt.
An Economy With One Debt Relationship
We begin with an economy that consists of two countries.
One country has a number of risk-neutral bankers, who we
call Swiss bankers. These bankers can commit to honoring
anycontractstheysign.Theothercountryisrepresentedby
the government, which has access to a country-speciﬁc in-
vestment project and needs to borrow resources to fund it.
Wewillshowthattherelationshipbetweenthegovernment
andthe Swissbankersnecessarilyhas transientbeneﬁtsfor
the government. Because of this, there is no equilibrium
with positive debt.
We prove this result by setting up a contradiction. We
suppose to the contrary that there is an equilibrium with
positivedebt.Insuchanequilibrium,thegovernmentmust
prefer repaying the debt to defaulting on it. We construct
a deviation for the government, from its original strategy,
in which it defaults on its debt and improves its welfare,
thus contradicting our original supposition. In this devia-
tion, the government will take the money it was supposed
to pay back to the bankers and safely save it and earn the
market rate of return.
To keep the notation simple, we will let the bankers the
government originally borrowed from be the same bank-
ers the government saves with after it defaults on its loans.
Clearly, the model can be interpreted as having one set of
bankers who lend to the government and another set who
let the government safely save with them. We will refer
to the one set of bankers in the model as Swiss bankers
when we want to emphasize that they will allow the gov-
ernment to safely save with them, regardless of the gov-
ernment’s past behavior, and we will refer to them simply
as bankers otherwise.
Speciﬁcally, in each period t, t = 0, ..., ¥, the economy
has a consumption-capital good, which is perishable and
cannot be stored during a period. Swiss bankers are risk
neutral, live for two periods, have a discount factor b, and
are endowed with a large amount of the consumption-cap-
ital good in each period. We suppose that each period has
two Swiss bankers, who are denoted i = 1, 2. (Assuming
two bankers yields the same results as assuming any num-
ber N > 1, and the assumption saves on notation.) The
government is inﬁnitely lived, is risk neutral, discounts the
future at rate b, and is endowed with zero units of the con-
sumption-capital good at the beginning of period 0.
In each period t, an investment of xt+1 units in period
t produces output of At+1xt+1 units in period t + 1. Here At
isadeterministicallyﬂuctuatingproductivityparameterthat
speciﬁestheinvestmentproject’sgrossreturn.Forsimplici-













0, if t is even
.
(Letting productivity ﬂuctuate is an easy way of giving the
government an incentive to borrow. This simple pattern of
ﬂuctuations makes the resulting borrowing pattern simple,
but is otherwise inessential.)
The project has a maximal size of one. Throughout the
article, we will assume that the discount factor satisﬁes
(2) bA >1
as well as b <1 .
To build intuition, let us begin by examining an econo-
my in which institutions are such that agents in both coun-
tries can and do commit to repaying their loans. We refer
to the resulting allocations as the full-commitment alloca-
tions. Competition among bankers ensures that the equi-
librium gross rate of interest on one-period loans that ma-
ture at t is Rt = r, where rº1/b. From inequality (2),
then, we know that the return on the project A is greater
than r; hence, with such an interest rate in each odd-num-
bered period, the government optimally borrows to fully
fundtheproject.Thus,ineachodd-numberedperiod,start-
ing with period 0, the government borrows one unit, in-
vests it, and consumes zero. In the next period, an even-
numbered period, the project yields Aunits of output, from
which the government repays the banker r; consumes the
rest,A − r;andborrowszero.Thediscountedvalueofutil-
ity under commitment is, thus,
(3) (A−r)+b
2( A − r )+b
4( A − r )+...=( A − r )/(1−b
2).
Ofcourse,sincethegovernmenthaslinearpreferencesand
its discount factor b satisﬁes b =1 / r , the timing of con-
sumption by the government can be structured in a variety
of ways to yield the same discounted value of utility.
Now consider an institutional setup in which the gov-
ernmentcannotcommittorepayingitsloans.Aprecisede-
scription of the timing of events in the model is as fol-
lows. In each period t, the government starts with new out-
put Atxt and the value of debt either owed or saved Rtbt,
where bt is the loan at t − 1 and Rt is the gross interest rate
on this loan. If bt > 0, then the government decides wheth-
er to repay old loans subject to the constraint
(4) ztRtbt £ Atxt
where zt = 1 corresponds to repayment by the government
and zt = 0, to default. Each Swiss banker, having seen the
default decision as well as the past actions of all agents, of-
fers the government a new loan contract. Each such con-
tract st+1 is a pair (Rt+1,bt+1) that speciﬁes a gross interest
rate and a loan amount. Let St+1 denote the set of loan con-
tracts offered. The government then chooses some speciﬁc
contract st+1 and decides how much to consume ct and in-
vest xt+1 subject to a constraint on the maximal size of the
project
(5) xt+1 £ 1
and the budget constraint
(6) ct + xt+1 − bt+1 = Atxt − ztRtbt.We are assuming, remember, that Swiss bankers have a
commitmentdevicethatcommitsthemtohonoringallcon-
tracts they sign. Thus, in any equilibrium, regardless of the
government’spastactions,ifthegovernmentwantstosave
any amount (any bt+1 < 0), the Swiss bankers will oblige it;
moreover, competition among the bankers will drive the
interest rate on such savings up to Rt+1 = r.
We set up and deﬁne equilibrium as follows. The his-
tory
(7) ht ={ [ z 0, S 1, s 1, x 1, c 0],...,[zt−1,St,st,xt,ct−1]}
records past actions for the government and the bankers
up to period t. A strategy for the government at t is a de-
fault decision zt(ht) made at the beginning of the period to-
getherwithloancontract,investment,andconsumptionde-
cisions, denoted st+1(ht,zt,St+1), xt+1(ht,zt,St+1), and ct(ht,zt,
St+1), made after both the default decision zt and the offer
of the new set of loan contracts St+1. A strategy for each
Swiss banker i =1 ,2a ttis a new loan contract st
i
+1(ht,zt).
We let St+1(ht,zt) denote the set of such loan contracts.
In this economy, a perfect equilibrium is a set of strate-
gies for the government and the bankers for each period
t that satisfy these two conditions:
1. For each history ht and (ht,zt,St+1), given the bankers’
strategies from t onward and the government’s strat-
egies from t + 1 onward, the government’s strategy
at t maximizes its payoff over the set of strategies
that satisfy (4)–(6) and st+1(ht,zt,St+1) Î St+1(ht,zt).
2. For each Swiss banker i, for each history (ht,zt), giv-
en the other banker’s strategy and the government’s
strategies, the contract offered st
i
+1(ht,zt) maximizes
the Swiss banker’s payoffs.
When interpreting this deﬁnition, note that we impose per-
fection by requiring both conditions to hold for all histo-
ries, including those that do not occur in equilibrium. Note
that in condition 1 we require that strategies be optimal on-
ly for a one-shot deviation from the original strategies. It is
well known that this is equivalent to requiring that these
strategies be optimal for all possible deviations from the
original strategies.
Wenowshowthatthefull-commitmentallocationscan-
not be supported as equilibrium allocations, regardless of
the discount factor. To see this, consider the full-commit-
ment allocations, and consider the decision to repay in
some even-numbered period t. If the government repays
at t, it gets A − r at t, A − r at t + 2, and so on. Consider
the following deviation. Suppose instead that the govern-
ment defaults at t. After defaulting, it has A units of out-
put, from which it consumes A − (1/r) units and saves 1/r
units with a Swiss banker. In period t + 1, an odd-num-
bered period, the Swiss banker safely returns one unit to
the government, and the government fully funds the proj-
ect. In period t + 2, the project yields A, the government
consumes A − (1/r) and saves 1/r with the Swiss banker,
and soon. Thisdeviation yields A − (1/r) inall even-num-
bered periods, while if the government continues with the
full-commitmentallocations,itreceivesonlyA − rineven
periods. Since r =1 / b> 1, the deviation is strictly pre-
ferred for all discount factors bÎ(0,1). Thus, in the econ-
omy with Swiss bankers, the full-commitment allocations
cannot be supported as equilibrium allocations.
The intuition is simply that once the government has
one unit on hand, it has no need to borrow any more; thus,
thevalueofmaintainingagoodrelationshipwiththebank-
ers is zero. Moreover, if the government breaks this rela-
tionship by defaulting, it saves the funds it owed; thus, de-
faultingdominatesmaintainingthegoodrelationship.More
generally,inthespiritofBulowandRogoff’s(1989b)The-
orem 1, we can prove the following:
PROPOSITION 1. In the economy with Swiss bankers, the
unique equilibrium allocations have zero debt.
The proof is in the Appendix. The intuition for this propo-
sition is similar to the intuition for why the full-commit-
ment allocations are not supportable as equilibrium allo-
cations. Consider any equilibrium, and consider the period
in which the present value of the debt owed by the govern-
ment is maximal. Since this value of the debt is the largest
it will ever be, in each subsequent period the government
is, on net, paying back the bankers. If the government in-
stead defaults and invests the funds it would have paid
back, it can ﬁnance its original investment pattern and in-
crease consumption.
Notice that in the period in which the present value of
thedebtowedbythegovernmentismaximal,thediscount-
ed value of the net beneﬁts of the debt relationship is less
than or equal to zero. Since this period of maximal debt
occurs in ﬁnite time, the beneﬁts from the debt relation-
ship are necessarily transient.
Adding Other Relationships
Now we add to the model other relationships that involve
trust. We will say that an agent’s reputation in one trust re-
lationship spills over to another trust relationship if actions
taken with regard to the ﬁrst relationship affect the equi-
librium actions of the parties to the other relationship. For
example, if a government’s decision to default on foreign
bankers causes a foreign oil company negotiating an oil
drilling lease with that government to withdraw from the
negotiations,thenthegovernment’slossofreputationwith-
in the international credit market induced by its default is
said to have spilled over to its relationship with the foreign
oil company.
We ﬁrst show that even with reputation spillover, if the
other relationship is another transient beneﬁt relationship,
our earlier results are unchanged: a sovereign country will
not repay its debt; hence, no positive debt can be support-
ed in equilibrium. We then show that if we add an endur-
ing beneﬁt relationship, a sovereign country will repay its
debt, and large amounts of debt can be supported.
With Transient Beneﬁts
Consider adding to the model with one transient beneﬁt
debt relationship another relationship with transient bene-
ﬁts. Clearly, the most trivial way to do that is to add an-
other debt relationship with another group of Swiss bank-
ersinanothercountrywhichsimplyreplicatestheﬁrstdebt
relationship.
Consider strategies in which a government’s misbehav-
iorinonedebtrelationshipspillsovertoaffectitstreatment
in another debt relationship. Speciﬁcally, consider strate-
gies for the bankers which specify that if the government
breaks a contract with either group of bankers in either
lending country, then no banker will lend it any funds
again. Faced with such strategies, the government will ei-ther simultaneously honor both types of debt contracts or
break both since breaking either one causes both groups
of bankers to stop lending. A moment’s reﬂection should
make it clear that in such a situation, even though reputa-
tion spills over across the debt relationships, positive debt
cannot be supported. Since both the beneﬁts and the losses
from defaulting in the model with two debt relationships
are simply twice what they are in the model with one debt
relationship, the default decisions are unchanged. Hence,
even with spillovers from one debt relationship to another,
no positive debt can be supported in equilibrium.
While this example is useful, it is somewhat special in
that the added relationship is totally symmetric to the ex-
istingone.Itisimportanttorealizethatevenifmisbehavior
in the debt relationship spills over to a very different type
ofrelationship,thisspillovercannotsupportdebtiftheoth-
er relationship has transient beneﬁts. In Cole and Kehoe
1995b,weconsideramodelinwhichtheotherrelationship
emerges from countries drawing from a common pool of
exhaustibleresources,likeacommonoilﬁeld.Weﬁndthat
whether or not the other relationship is transient depends
on speciﬁc details of the technology. We can easily con-
structotherexamples,likeprotectingagivenstockofintel-
lectual property rights or building a single space station,
that work in a similar way. A common characteristic of
such examples is that the beneﬁts from behaving well in
the relationship are transient: the value of maintaining a
good relationship goes to zero in ﬁnite time.
With Enduring Beneﬁts
Now consider adding to the original model a relationship
withenduringbeneﬁts.Insucharelationship,thediscount-
ed value of beneﬁts from behaving well from any point in
time onward never goes to zero. The simplest example of
such a relationship is a repeated relationship in which the
per period beneﬁts are constant. More elaborate examples
would include relationships with physical state variables.
We illustrate how differently spillovers to enduring beneﬁt
relationships work by considering a simple repeated rela-
tionship.
Consider adding a labor relationship to the debt model.
This labor relationship emanates from a project which is
available in each period. If the number of workers hired
for the project is Nt, the project’s output is ANt. The proj-
ect has a maximal size of N. (The assumption that the la-
bor project has the same productivity as the investment
project is for notational simplicity only.) The economy has
a large number of domestic agents who have the special-
ized skills the government needs to run the project. Each
of these workers is risk neutral and has an alternative em-
ployment opportunity that earns a worker w units with cer-
tainty in each period. We assume that
(8) bA ³w .
We will model the government as maximizing its utility
subject to its resource constraints. With a little more nota-
tion, we could instead model the government as maximiz-
ing the welfare of its citizens, providing public goods by
using specialized resources, and taxing in a distorting way.
When there is full commitment, the equilibrium is as
follows: In each period, the government hires N workers
at wage w and pays them a total of wN. In period 0, the
government takes a loan of one unit from the bankers and
invests it. Ineach even-numbered period after period0, the
government borrows one unit, invests one, and consumes
(A−w)N. In each odd-numbered period after period 0, it
repays the bankers r out of the investment project’s return
of A, borrows and invests zero, and consumes (A−w)N +
A − r.
Consider the model in which the government cannot
commit to honoring contracts. The timing of the model is
the same as before, with these additions. In the beginning
of each period, each of the large number of workers offers
an employment schedule. Each worker j offers to supply
nt(j,wt) units of labor to the government for a promise of
wt units of pay, where nt is either zero or one. Confronted
with a continuum of such wage schedules, all of which are
identical,the governmentannouncessomeparticular wage
wt together with an employment cap Nt. The output of the
labor project is realized immediately. After that the gov-
ernment decides whether or not to honor its contracts with
the bankers and the workers. We let zt
b = 1 and zt
n = 1 cor-
respond to honoring the debt and labor contracts. The con-
straints faced by the government are
(9) zt
bRtbt + zt
nwtNt £ Axt + ANt
together with
(10) ct + xt+1 − bt+1 = Atxt + ANt − zt
bRtbt − zt
nwtNt
(11) xt+1 £ 1
(12) Nt £ N.
In (10) we have assumed that the number of workers is
Nt.
Consider strategies in which misbehavior by the gov-
ernment in the debt relationship spills over to the labor
relationship and vice versa. Speciﬁcally, suppose that the
bankers’ and workers’ strategies specify that if the govern-
ment ever breaks either the debt contract or the labor con-
tract, it will never be trusted again: bankers will never lend
to it, and workers will never work for it. We will show that
even with such a spillover, positive borrowing can be sup-
ported in equilibrium. Indeed, if the government is suffi-
cientlypatient,thefull-commitmentallocationscanbesup-
ported.




n = 1 for all s < t,
(13) St ={ ( R t,bt) Rt = r, bt £ 1}.
That is, the bankers will lend at rate r any amount up to
one. For any history in which there has been a default,
(14) St ={ ( R t,bt) Rt = r, bt £ 0}.
Thus,bankersdonotlend.Lettheworkers’strategiesspec-
ify that for any history with no previous default, nt(j,wt)=
1i fw t³wand zero otherwise. For any history with a de-
fault, nt(j,wt) = 0. The government’s strategy speciﬁes its
full-commitment allocations if it has never defaulted in the
past. If it has defaulted, then the government’s strategies
specify that it self-ﬁnance the investment project, borrow
nothing, and pay the workers nothing. Call these strategies
the spillover strategies. We then havePROPOSITION 2. In an economy with debt and labor rela-
tionships, there exists a b — Î (0,1) such that for all bÎ
[ b — ,1] the full-commitment allocations are supportable as
equilibrium outcomes.
Proof. Consider the spillover strategies deﬁned above.
Consider, ﬁrst, histories with no defaults before period t.
It is optimal for the workers to work if wt ³w ; and if the
period is even-numbered, it is optimal for the lenders to
lend one unit at rate Rt ³r , if the government’s strategy
is to not default. It is also optimal for the government to
hire N workers at wage w and borrow one unit at rate r
in even periods. The only interesting question is with re-
gard to the government’s default decision. If the govern-
ment defaults on both contracts, it saves the current pay-
ments to bankers and workers, r + wN. However, it loses
the surplus from the labor project, (A−w)N, from t + 1 on-
ward. Thus, sticking with full commitment is at least as
good as the deviation if
(15) r + wN £b ( A − w ) N /(1−b).
As b increases to one, the left side of (15) monotonically
decreases to 1 + wN (since r =1 / b ) while the right side
monotonically increases to inﬁnity. Thus, there is some
b — Î (0,1) such that (15) holds for all bÎ( b —,1).
For histories after deviations, the strategies are clearly
optimal. Thus, the above strategies constitute a perfect
equilibrium if bÎ[ b —,1]. Q.E.D.
So far we have investigated conditions under which the
full-commitment allocations are supportable as equilibri-
um outcomes. Even if these conditions are not met, it may
be possible to support some positive borrowing. From the
proof of Proposition 2, it is clear that in any period t, as
long as
(16) rbt £ [b(A−w)N/(1−b)] − wN
the government will prefer to honor its commitments rath-
er than to default. The right side of (16) can be interpreted
as the surplus utility the government obtains from main-
taining its reputation in the enduring beneﬁt relationship.
Hence, the smaller is N and the larger is w, the smaller is
the surplus in the enduring beneﬁt relationship and, thus,
the smaller is the amount of debt that can be supported in
equilibrium.
So far we have investigated one particular type of strat-
egies for this model in which reputation spills over across
the two types of relationships. Of course, since this model
has an inﬁnite horizon, there are a large number of other
equilibria in which such a spillover does not occur and no
debt is supported in equilibrium. In particular, consider
strategies in which misbehavior in one relationship affects
only the actions of agents in that relationship and doesn’t
spill over to the other relationships. Speciﬁcally, suppose
that workers will continue to work as long as the govern-
ment doesn’t default on the labor contract and that bankers
will continue to lend as long as the government doesn’t
default on its debt contract. These nonspillover strategies
can clearly support an equilibrium with workers working
positive amounts, but the strategies can’t support any posi-
tive borrowing—for the same reasons as before.
We might want to go further and ask, can we construct
a version of the model in which this spillover must occur?
We think of this exercise as examining what type of mod-
el we need for the spillover equilibria to be, in some sense,
the natural equilibria of the model. In Cole and Kehoe,
forthcoming, we consider a ﬁnite-horizon version of this
model with incomplete information. In it there is a gov-
ernment with the same preferences as the one considered
here. In addition, there is a (vanishingly) small probability
that the government is pathologically honest, in that it suf-
fersadirectutilitycostfromnothonoringcontracts.Wein-
terpret the existence of this honest government as captur-
ing a shred of doubt in the minds of bankers that the gov-
ernment they are facing may pay back their loans for some
reasonotherthan thenarrowlydeﬁnedpecuniary costsand
beneﬁts of so doing. (This interpretation follows that given
in the chain store literature by Kreps and Wilson 1982 and
Milgrom and Roberts 1982.)
In thissetup, thehonest government honorsall debtand
labor contracts. Thus, if a private agent, either a banker or
a worker, sees the government break either type of con-
tract, the agent knows that the government is not honest.
A simple backward induction argument implies thatwork-
ers will never work for, or bankers lend to, a government
that they know is not honest. Hence, the normal govern-
mentwilleitherhonor bothtypesofcontractorbreak both,
since breaking either one causes the government to lose its
reputation. Thus, the reputation of not being trustworthy in
the debt relationship necessarily spills over to the labor re-
lationship and vice versa.
In Cole and Kehoe, forthcoming, we show that for any
ﬁxed time horizon there is (essentially) a unique equilib-
rium. Moreover, both the ﬁnite-horizon strategies and the
equilibria of the incomplete information model converge
naturally to the inﬁnite-horizon strategies and the equilib-
ria of the complete information model. These results im-
ply that there is both a close and a natural connection be-
tweentheﬁnite-horizonincompleteinformationresultsand
the inﬁnite-horizon complete information results. Indeed,
we think of these results as providing one possible moti-
vation for focusing on the equilibrium with spillover ef-
fects in the inﬁnite-horizon model.
Conclusion
We have developed a general reputation model in which
countries repay their debt even when they do not face di-
rect sanctions. The basic idea of our model is that if coun-
tries misbehave in one relationship, they will suffer nega-
tive consequences in other relationships. A necessary con-
dition for countries to repay their debt is that misbehavior
in the debt relationship spills over to a relationship which
has enduring beneﬁts for the countries.
The idea that an agent’s reputation in one relationship
may spill over into other relationships is certainly not new.
In most of the literature, however, the spillover is such that
actions of agents in one arena of behavior affect reputation
in that arena only. In the debt literature, for example, if a
country defaults, it ruins its reputation in the debt arena; in
the industrial organization literature on entry deterrence, if
an incumbent doesn’t ﬁght entry, it ruins the incumbent’s
reputation in the entry deterrence arena. Here we have
shown that when spillovers stay within the debt arena, rep-
utation cannot support lending. For that, a country’s ac-
tions in the debt arena must spill over to a different arena,one with enduring beneﬁts. Viewed this way, the beneﬁts
of maintaining a good relationship in one arena cannot be
calculated simply by looking at that arena alone. Instead,
account must be taken of the ramiﬁcations in a variety of
other arenas, which, at least on the surface, may not seem
to be directly connected to the arena in which the misbe-
havior occurs.
This basic idea can be applied in many contexts. It
might explain why countries honor some commitments,
like treaties, when a narrow cost/beneﬁt analysis would
recommend breaking them. Consider, for example, a ﬁsh-
ing treaty between the United States and Canada. Suppose
that at the time the treaty was signed, it seemed like a good
idea,butlaterdevelopmentsrevealthatthetreatyiscosting
the United States a lot. Nonetheless, the United States
might honor the treaty because breaking it would damage
its reputation with Canada in other relationships that in-
volve trust. Moreover, breaking the treaty might cause a
negative reputation spillover with, say, the Japanese in a
different arena that involves a trust relationship, such as a
mutual defense pact.
*KehoethankstheNationalScienceFoundationandtheRonaldS.LauderFounda-
tion for research support.
†InCole andKehoe 1995a,we explainhow differentassumptions aboutthe ability
to save after a default lead to different results.
Pesendorfer (1992) and Mohr (1991) have looked at conditions for the existence
of a reputation equilibrium. Pesendorfer (1992) considers a scenario in which a govern-
ment must assemble an optimal portfolio from existing ﬁnancial assets in the world
market. In that scenario, even if the set of world assets is complete, adding the restric-
tion that each asset in the portfolio must be held in a positive position may force the
government to bear risk. The fear of bearing such risk may be sufficient to give the
government an incentive to repay its debt. Mohr (1991) shows that a reputation equilib-
rium might exist in an overlapping generations model if a government can run a type
of rational Ponzi scheme.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Here we provide the proof for the ﬁrst proposition that we dis-
cuss in the preceding paper.
PROPOSITION1.In theeconomywithSwiss bankers,theunique
equilibrium allocations have zero debt.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Competition among bank-
ers guarantees that they break even on any loan, so
(A1) (Rtzt−r)bt =0 .
This means that the government earns the market rate on both
loans and savings. Therefore, if any loans are made, the gross
interest rate is r; that is, if zt = 1 and bt ¹ 0, then Rt = r.I fz t=
0, then no loans are made, so bt = 0. Clearly, bt cannot be greater
than or equal to 1/r in any equilibrium. If it were, then the gov-
ernment would certainly prefer to deviate by defaulting on the
amount owed rbt and then consuming rbt − (1/r) in extra con-
sumption in period t and saving 1/r. In all future odd-numbered
periods,itwould usethepayofffromitssavings tofullyfundthe
project. In all future even-numbered periods, it would consume
A − (1/r) and save 1/r. Since bt is bounded in equilibrium,
(A2) limt®¥b
tbt =0 .
Next, we show that bt cannot be any strictly positive number
between 0 and 1. By way of contradiction, suppose that in some




Thus, r is the period in which the present value of borrowing is
the largest. Clearly, r is ﬁnite since bt £ 1 for all t. If multiple
periods satisfy (A3), then let r be the earliest such period. Con-
sider,fornow,thegovernmentdeviatinginperiodrbydefaulting
inr andthensaving atrater thefundsitwouldhave beenrepay-
ing the bankers and instead using those funds to self-ﬁnance the
original consumption levels and investment. Speciﬁcally, new
debt, consumption, and investment levels ˆ bt,c ˆ t,and ˆ xt satisfy,






(A5) c ˆt = ct
(A6) ˆ xt = xt.
Notice that (A4) simply states that the present value of the new
debt sequence equals the present value of the original debt se-
quence minus the present value of the defaulted-on debt. Of
course, we can also write this in period t units as
(A7) ˆ bt = bt − r
t−rbr
for t ³ r, so that the new debt sequence equals the original one
minus the rolled-forward value of the defaulted-on debt.
To show that this deviation is feasible, we must show that the
new debt sequence b ˆ
t is nonpositive and that at the original con-
sumption and investment allocations the following hold:
(A8) ct + xt+1 − ˆ bt+1 − Atxt + rˆ bt =0
(A9) rˆ bt £ Atxt.
Clearly, b ˆ
t is nonpositive from the deﬁnition of period r. And
ˆ bt <bt,so(A9)holds.Toseethat(A8)holds,notethatfrom(A7)
(A10) −ˆ bt+1 + rˆ bt =− ( b t +1−r
t+1−rbt)+r ( b t− r
t − rb r)
=− b t +1 + rbt.
So (A8) holds, since the budget constraint held at the old alloca-
tions. Thus, this deviation, which makes the government as well
off as the original allocation, is feasible.
To show that the agent can be made strictly better off, note







Clearly, in some sufficiently late period, consumption can be in-
creased while the rest of the allocation is unaffected. Q.E.D.
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